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“Payability” as the Logical Corollary to “Collectibility” in 
Legal Malpractice 
     Abstract.  The collectibility requirement as part of the legal 
malpractice plaintiff’s affirmative case is well-established and regarded by 
most courts as a critical part of the plaintiff’s proof of proximate causation.  
Conversely, where the legal malpractice plaintiff was the defendant in the 
underlying lawsuit, to be successful in the malpractice suit, the plaintiff 
must prove that it had a meritorious defense that would have made a 
difference to the outcome of the case had the lawyer properly asserted and 
pursued the defense.   
 
Prompted by the conflicting opinions of two federal courts on this issue, 
courts have begun to discuss whether the judgment debtor turned legal 
malpractice plaintiff should also have to prove the ability to pay all or part 
of the judgment entered against it to recover the amount of the judgment 
as damages in a legal malpractice action.  This Article joins that 
conversation and discusses the competing views on adopting a payability 
requirement for legal malpractice claims.   
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
The collectibility requirement as part of the legal malpractice plaintiff’s 
affirmative case is well-established and regarded by most courts as a critical 
part of the plaintiff’s proof of proximate causation.1  On the other hand, 
to be successful in the subsequent malpractice suit where the legal 
malpractice plaintiff was the defendant in the underlying lawsuit, the 
plaintiff must prove that he or she had a meritorious defense that would 
have made a difference to the outcome of the case had the lawyer properly 
asserted and pursued the defense.2  In adopting these requirements, courts 
have made a strategic effort to avoid a windfall opportunity for a legal 
malpractice plaintiff who did not suffer any actual damages as a result of 
the lawyer’s negligence.3  Nevertheless, is that enough? 
Prompted by the conflicting opinions of two federal courts on this 
issue,4 courts have begun to discuss whether the judgment debtor turned 
legal malpractice plaintiff should also have to prove the ability to pay all or 
part of the judgment entered against him or her in order to recover the 
amount of the judgment as damages in a legal malpractice action.5  This 
Article joins that conversation and discusses the competing views on 
adopting a payability requirement for legal malpractice claims. 
This Article begins with a review of the collectibility requirement, 
including the policy behind the requirement and the majority versus the 
minority rule on collectibility.  Second, this Article looks at the 
meritorious defense requirement for the legal malpractice plaintiff who 
suffered a judgment in the underlying lawsuit.  Next, the Article focuses on 
 
 1. See Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989) (explaining the elements of a 
cause of action for legal malpractice); Blanks v. Shaw, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 725 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(listing the elements for professional negligence in a civil malpractice case); Lindenman v. Kreitzer, 
775 N.Y.S.2d 4, 8 (App. Div. 2004) (commenting on the plaintiff’s burden of proof when suing for 
legal malpractice). 
2. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 403 (4th Cir. 1916) (requiring the plaintiff to show 
that he could have avoided the judgment entered against him were it not for the malpractice of his 
lawyer).  
3. See McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 658 (App. Div. 2001) (declaring the 
injuries the plaintiff suffered from the accident were separate from whatever loss the defendant 
incurred as a result of the defendants’ failure to file a suit after the accident, and only the former were 
recoverable for legal malpractice). 
4. See McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that a 
debtor cannot recover damages for a judgment that has been discharged); Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 
F.3d 411, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2007) (ruling that a trustee was not barred from pursuing damages 
despite the existence of a bankruptcy discharge). 
5. Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 1994) (determining that the plaintiff did not 
have to prove that the underlying judgment was collectible in order to recover).  
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two federal court opinions, McClarty v. Gudeanu6 from the Eastern 
District of Michigan and Stanley v. Trinchard7 from the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, wherein the courts expressed opposite views on whether 
a legal malpractice plaintiff—who will never have to pay the judgment 
entered against it in the underlying lawsuit—should be able to collect the 
amount of the judgment as damages for legal malpractice.  This study will 
include a look back at the debate over the judgment rule versus the 
payment rule and the various compromises courts have made in adopting 
one rule or the other.  Finally, the Article concludes with a discussion 
about why a payability requirement makes sense as a corollary to the 
collectibility requirement in legal malpractice cases. 
II.     BASIC ELEMENTS OF PROOF FOR A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM 
The elements of legal malpractice are well-established and shared among 
the various states.8  According to the court in Cosgrove v. Grimes,9 to 
establish a claim for legal malpractice, “[t]he plaintiff must prove that there 
is a duty owed to him by the defendant, a breach of that duty, that the 
breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury and that damages 
occurred.”10  Proximate cause consists of two elements: (1) cause-in-fact 
and (2) foreseeability.11  According to Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, 
Inc.,12 cause-in-fact, also referred to as the “but for” test, is “whether the 
negligent ‘act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about 
injury,’ without which the harm would have not occurred.”13 
The essential question for a legal malpractice claim is whether a 
reasonable and prudent strategy and course of action by the lawyer would 
have led to a different result in the underlying litigation.  A simple error in 
judgment will generally not constitute malpractice.14  Moreover, the 
 
6. McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995). 
7. Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2007). 
8. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989) (“The plaintiff must prove that there 
is a duty owed to him by the defendant, a breach of that duty, that the breach proximately caused the 
plaintiff injury and that damages occurred.”); Blanks v. Shaw, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 725 (Ct. App. 
2009) (listing the same four elements for civil malpractice cases that are listed in Cosgrove); 
Lindenman v. Kreitzer, 775 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6–9 (App. Div. 2004) (examining the elements of a 
malpractice claim). 
9. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1989). 
10. Id. at 665.  
11. Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995). 
12. Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1995). 
13. Id. at 477 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd, 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 
(Tex. 1995)). 
14. See Blanks v. Shaw, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 725 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating that the plaintiff 
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attorney’s mere selection of one option among a number of reasonable and 
prudent options is not malpractice.  The court in Cosgrove v. Grimes held 
that “[i]f an attorney makes a decision which a reasonably prudent attorney 
could make in the same or similar circumstance, it is not an act of 
negligence even if the result is undesirable.”15  Cosgrove further stated, 
“[t]he standard is an objective exercise of professional judgment, not the 
subjective belief that his acts are in good faith.”16  Attorneys cannot be 
held strictly liable for imperfect decisions or for unfulfilled client 
expectations.17  The fact finder must evaluate the attorney’s conduct based 
upon the information available to the attorney at the time they made their 
decision.18  Thus, legal malpractice cannot be based on Monday morning 
quarterbacking. 
In addition to the standard elements for any negligence claim, the legal 
malpractice plaintiff who loses a cause of action because of their attorney’s 
negligence faces a higher burden.  Known as the suit-within-a-suit, case-
within-a-case, or trial-within-a-trial requirement, this doctrine serves as a 
procedural and evidentiary tool for addressing the proximate causation 
element of a plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim, and requires the plaintiff to 
prove that but for the lawyer’s misconduct, he or she would have been 
successful in the underlying action.19  This burden is a distinctive feature 
unique to legal malpractice claims that adds an extra layer to proving 
proximate causation.20 
 
has the burden to show he or she would have achieved a more favorable outcome in the underlying 
cause of action had the defendant lawyer not breached his or her duty owed to the plaintiff); see also 
Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 664 (declaring that errors in judgment may not be malpractice if the error 
was made in good faith).  
15. Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 665. 
16. Id. (holding that legal malpractice liability is based on an objective standard); see also 
Ambriz v. Kelegian, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 708 (Ct. App. 2007) (detailing the fundamental burdens 
of proof for a plaintiff in a legal malpractice case); Crestwood Cove Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner, 
164 P.3d 1247, 1253–54 (Utah 2007) (comparing various standards in determining whether an 
attorney acted negligently). 
17. See Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 664 (contending that attorneys should not be liable for every 
mistake or lost case). 
18. See id. (noting the basis of the attorney evaluation in a legal malpractice claim). 
19. See Blanks, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 725 (describing the dynamics of the “trial-within-a-trial 
method”); see also Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 856 N.E.2d 389, 395 (Ill. 2006) 
(noting that the idea of a legal malpractice action is to redress an actual harm); Lindenman v. 
Kreitzer, 775 N.Y.S.2d 4, 8 (App. Div. 2004) (finding that a malpractice action must be based on 
actual harm); Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. 
denied) (“Because the plaintiff must establish that the underlying suit would have been won ‘but for’ 
the attorney’s breach of duty, this ‘suit within a suit’ requirement is necessarily a component of the 
plaintiff’s burden on cause in fact.”). 
20. See Lindenman, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (“It is only after the plaintiff has proved the case within 
10 TOSTRUD_GRIFFIN_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:28 AM 
2014] “Payability” as the Logical Corollary to “Collectibility” 413 
The suit-within-a-suit burden is, without question, significant for legal 
malpractice plaintiffs.21  In essence, the plaintiff must win two trials: the 
underlying litigation and the subsequent malpractice suit.22  Without it, 
however, the legal malpractice plaintiff could prevail based on “malpractice 
in a vacuum.”23  As the California Supreme Court stated, “The purpose of 
this requirement, which has been in use for more than 120 years, is to 
safeguard against speculative and conjectural claims.”24  The suit-within-a-
suit requirement requires the plaintiff to prove by factual evidence, rather 
than by supposition of what might have happened in the underlying 
lawsuit absent the attorney’s negligence.25  It ensures that the legal 
malpractice plaintiff recovers only his or her actual damages caused by the 
malpractice.26  After all, that is the essence of awarding compensatory 
damages to a tort victim. 
III. THE COLLECTIBILITY REQUIREMENT 
A. The Policy Behind Requiring Proof of Collectibility 
In the majority of states, in order to meet the suit-within-a-suit 
requirement, the plaintiff must prove what is known as “collectibility.”27  
 
the case, including the value of the lost judgment, that the issue of collectibility may arise.”). 
21. See id. (considering the heavy burden of the suit-within-a-suit requirement). 
22. See, e.g., McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (App. Div. 2001) (noting 
that legal malpractice plaintiffs have to prosecute two lawsuits and essentially recreate the underlying 
action to prevail); see also Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal 
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 493 (2008) (“[C]ausation requires the malpractice plaintiff to win 
two trials: the original litigation and the later malpractice suit.”). 
23. See Schneider v. Richardson, 411 A.2d 656, 658 (Me. 1979) (contending that the suit-
within-a-suit requirement arose from the policy that “mere negligence on the part of an attorney is 
not sufficient to impose liability,” unless the client suffered actual damages as a result of the 
malpractice). 
24. Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1052 (Cal. 2003) (citing Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur 
Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780 (1997)). 
25. See Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockler, PC v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Mich. 1989) 
(providing that the suit-within-a-suit requirement should “satisfy the requirement that the client 
prove damages based on factual evidence”). 
26. In Viner, the court noted that without the suit-within-a-suit requirement, it would be 
entirely too easy for the legal malpractice plaintiff to make the lawyer a scapegoat for the deal or 
lawsuit that did not go as planned.  See Viner, 70 P.3d at 1052.  To avoid this, courts must pay close 
attention to the cause-in-fact element and deny recovery where the unfavorable result likely would 
have occurred regardless of the malpractice, or where the result was caused by the client’s own lapse 
in judgment.  Id. at 1051–52. 
27. See McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (reasoning that the plaintiff must show the defendant’s 
negligence caused actual damages that the court can remedy in legal malpractice litigation); see also 
Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1989) (“The two issues should have inquired as to 
the amount of damages recoverable and collectible from Stephens if the suit had been properly 
10 TOSTRUD_GRIFFIN_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:28 AM 
414 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:408 
This means proof that but for the attorney’s negligence, the plaintiff would 
have prevailed in the underlying lawsuit and would have been able to 
collect on the judgment.28  In Texas, for example, the legal malpractice 
plaintiff must prove that he or she would have recovered a judgment for a 
specific amount had the attorney handled the underlying case properly.29 
In enforcing the collectibility requirement, the court in McKenna v. 
Forsyth & Forsyth30 reasoned that “[l]imiting damages in a legal 
malpractice action to the amount of collectible judgment” in the 
underlying lawsuit “is consistent with the purpose of compensatory 
damages, i.e., ‘to make the injured client whole.’”31  To hold otherwise 
would give former clients a windfall opportunity to be in a better position 
because of the legal malpractice action than they would have been in 
following the underlying lawsuit.32  As a matter of fairness, it would be 
inequitable for the malpractice plaintiff to recover a judgment against the 
attorney for an amount greater than what the plaintiff would have 
recovered and collected in the underlying lawsuit.33  The damages in a 
legal malpractice case for a lost cause of action are what the legal 
malpractice plaintiff would have recovered and been able to pocket had the 
underlying suit been properly prosecuted.34  The collectibility requirement 
achieves this damage result for the former client. 
Courts require strict proof of collectibility.35  Proof of collectibility may 
include the fair market value of the defendant’s net assets that would have 
been subject to payment of the judgment, evidence of the judgment 
debtor’s financial status sufficient to pay the judgment, or the amount that 
 
prosecuted.”). 
28. E.g., Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 666 (finding evidence that the plaintiff had been adversely 
affected by the negligent actions of his lawyer). 
29. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 
106, 109 (Tex. 2009) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to calculate damages). 
30. McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 2001). 
31. Id. at 657 (quoting Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 555 N.E.2d 611, 613 
(N.Y. 1990)) (discussing the fairness and consistency of limiting damages of legal malpractice to 
collectible judgments). 
32. See id. (stressing the inequity of allowing a recovery that would exceed the collectible 
damages of the underlying action in a malpractice suit). 
33. See Lavigne v. Chase, Haskell, Hayes & Kalamon, P.S., 50 P.3d 306, 309 (Wash. App. 
2002) (“In the legal malpractice context, proximate cause boils down to whether the client would 
have fared better but for the attorney’s negligence.” (citing Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600, 603 
(Wash. 1985) (en banc))). 
34. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Farrish-LeDuc, 882 A.2d 44, 50 (Conn. 2005) (justifying the 
court’s reward of damages by concluding that they are equal to the damages that would have been 
recovered had the malpractice not been committed). 
35. See, e.g., id. at 53 (limiting the damages recovered by the plaintiff in her malpractice suit to 
the exact dollar amount she would have recovered in her personal injury claim). 
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would have been paid on the judgment by another, such as by a guarantor 
or insurer.36  Proof that a defendant in the underlying lawsuit could have 
satisfied a judgment prior to when it was signed is not probative of 
collectibility for the subsequent malpractice action unless the plaintiff also 
proves that the underlying defendant could have satisfied the judgment at 
the time of entry.37 
For example, in Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. National 
Development & Research Corp.,38 the Texas Supreme Court held that 
evidence showing the defendant in the underlying lawsuit “owned 
numerous subsidiaries with hundreds of millions of dollars” in assets was 
not sufficient to show that the defendant itself had sufficient assets to pay 
the lost judgment.39  In addition, several pieces of the evidence brought 
forward to prove collectibility dated back to before the judgment was 
signed; therefore, they did not constitute evidence of collectibility as of the 
date the judgment was entered.40  Absent sufficient proof of collectibility, 
Akin Gump’s former client could not recover damages for its legal 
malpractice claim in the amount of the judgment it lost as a result of the 
lawyer’s negligence.41 
On the other hand, in DiPalma v. Seldman,42 the California Court of 
Appeals held that evidence that the judgment debtors in the underlying 
action had a $700,000 mortgage from the sale of a piece of property, 
$237,000 in refinancing proceeds, an equity interest in thirty to forty 
properties, twelve to eighteen construction projects currently in progress, 
and $30,000 from the auctioning of a restaurant in bankruptcy, was 
sufficient to prove collectibility of a judgment with a balance of less than 
 
36. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 
106, 109 (Tex. 2009) (comparing the difference between the collectible funds and the damages that 
would have paid from the underlying defendant’s net assets, and holding that the difference was 
grounds for reversal); see also Fernandes v. Barrs, 641 So. 2d 1371, 1376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) 
(listing possible ways a plaintiff may prove that the original tortfeasor would have had the funds to 
award the original damages). 
37. See Akin, 299 S.W.3d at 113–14 (concluding that evidence of wealth before a final 
judgment is irrelevant and therefore not probative, except in cases where the defendant continued to 
have sufficient funds). 
38. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 
106 (Tex. 2009). 
39. See id. at 112–15 (pointing out that pre-judgment evidence of solvency should be sufficient 
in most instances to prove collectibility). 
40. See id. at 116–18 (summarizing that none of the evidence cited by the respondent was 
“legally sufficient to prove collectibility of damages it would have been awarded”). 
41. Id. at 111. 
42. DiPalma v. Seldman, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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$200,000.43  Specifically, the court held that as a result of the evidence set 
forth above, “a complexion of some solvency [was] suggested” to establish 
collectibility of the judgment.44  Regardless of the jurisdiction, proof of 
collectibility is a steep burden.45 
B. Majority Versus Minority Rule 
The majority rule is that the legal malpractice plaintiff has the burden of 
proof to establish collectibility.46  Proof of collectibility as part of the legal 
malpractice plaintiff’s burden to prove proximate causation is the rule in 
several states, including Texas, California, Florida, and New York.47 
For example, in McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, McKenna filed a legal 
 
43. See id. at 224–25 (declaring that ownership of a mortgage, property interests, and other 
funds were sufficient to evidence collectibility of a judgment). 
44. Id. at 225 (quoting Walker v. Porter, 118 Cal. Rptr. 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1974)).  
45. See Klump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368, 1374 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing the difficult burden 
of proof required of the plaintiff). 
46. See id. (taking the majority position in holding that the plaintiff has the burden to show 
collectibility); DiPalma, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220–21 (“A plaintiff who establishes legal malpractice in 
prosecuting a claim must also prove careful management would have resulted in a favorable judgment 
and collection of same.” (citations omitted)); Fernandes v. Barrs, 641 So. 2d 1371, 1375 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1994) (citing the general rule that the legal malpractice plaintiff must prove both that he 
would have achieved a favorable result but for the attorney’s negligence, and also that the judgment 
to which he was entitled would have been collectible); Allen Decorating v. Oxendine, 483 S.E.2d 
298, 301 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming that a former client in a legal malpractice claim against his 
attorney has the burden of proof to show that his prior claim was valid, and that the court would 
have rendered a favorable, collectible judgment, in order for the court to award him damages); Kohler 
v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 304 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (requiring the plaintiff to 
show the legitimacy of the lost claim that could have been realized if not for the attorney’s 
negligence); Poly v. Moylan, 667 N.E.2d 250, 255 (Mass. 1996) (determining that a legal 
malpractice plaintiff is limited to recovering damages from “what he could have collected from the 
defendant in the underlying [action] but for the attorney’s negligence”); McKenna v. Forsyth & 
Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (App. Div. 2001) (“It has long been the rule in New York that 
damages recoverable in [a] legal malpractice action are limited to the amount that ‘could or would 
have been collected’ in the underlying action.” (quoting Schimitt v. McMillan, 162 N.Y.S. 437, 439 
(App. Div. 1916))); Little v. Matthewson, 442 S.E.2d 567, 571 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that a 
legal malpractice plaintiff must prove that the underlying claim was valid, that it would have resulted 
in a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, and that the judgment would have been collectible), aff’d, 455 
S.E.2d 160 (N.C. 1995); Tilly v. Doe, 746 P.2d 323, 326 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding “the trial 
court did not err in requiring proof of collectibility” from the plaintiff because the legal malpractice 
plaintiff has the burden of proof).  
47. See DiPalma, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220–21 (affirming the collectibility requirement in a legal 
malpractice claim); Fernandes, 641 So. 2d at 1375 (mandating the plaintiff show both “that a 
favorable result would have been achieved in the underlying litigation” and that any judgment 
rendered would have been collectible); McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 655 (noting the majority rule, 
which places the burden of proof of collectibility on the plaintiff).  See generally Ballesteros v. Jones, 
985 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (explaining the necessity of the 
collectibility requirement in a legal malpractice action). 
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malpractice action against his lawyers after they failed to file a personal 
injury lawsuit within the statute of limitations.48  The trial court ordered a 
bifurcated trial so the jury could hear the issue of liability and damages in 
the first case, and the issue of potential collectible damages in the 
second.49  At the end of the first phase, the jury found that McKenna had 
sustained damages in excess of $500,000 as a result of the car accident.50  
During the second phase of the trial, the lawyer-defendants presented 
evidence that the limit of the underlying defendant’s liability coverage was 
$50,000 and ultimately the defendant would have had to file bankruptcy 
to pay the $500,000 verdict against him.51  Accordingly, the jury found 
that the amount that would have been collectible by McKenna in the 
underlying lawsuit was $50,000, and the trial court entered judgment 
against the lawyer-defendants in that amount.52  In reviewing the trial 
court’s judgment, the New York Appellate Court held that the loss 
sustained by McKenna related to the car accident was separate and distinct 
from the loss resulting from the lawyers’ malpractice in failing to timely 
file the lawsuit.53  Thus, it was proper for the trial court to limit the 
judgment against the defendants to the amount that would have been 
collectible by McKenna in the underlying personal injury case.54  In 
addition, the trial court properly placed the burden to prove collectibility 
on McKenna.55  The appellate court held that doing so was neither unfair 
nor illogical, because proof of collectibility is part of the plaintiff’s case for 
legal malpractice.56 
In contrast, a minority of courts have held that collectibility is an 
affirmative defense that must be pled and proven by the lawyer-
 
48. See McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 655–56 (affirming the $50,000 judgment against 
McKenna’s lawyers as the collectible amount in the underlying lawsuit). 
49. See id. at 656 (defining the procedures of each phase of the legal malpractice lawsuit). 
50. Id.  
51. See id. (“Defendants presented evidence that the limit of Schoenhardt’s liability coverage at 
the time of the accident was $50,000 . . . that Schoenhardt would not be able to pay a judgment of 
$500,000 and that he would have declared bankruptcy if a judgment in that amount were entered 
against him.”). 
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 657. 
54. Id.  
55. Id.  
56. See McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (App. Div. 2001) (affirming 
the majority opinion of the courts concerning the plaintiff’s burden of proof of collectibility); see also 
Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 453, 492 (2008) (“The majority of courts add a second caveat as well: the plaintiff must prove 
that she would have won the underlying judgment and collected it.”). 
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defendant.57  Courts adopting the minority rule have done so with a 
sympathetic attitude towards the twice-wronged legal malpractice plaintiff 
who faces a steep burden to recover any damages.58  The minority-view 
courts have criticized proof of collectibility as part of the plaintiff’s burden 
of proof on several grounds: (1) it “ignores the possibility of a settlement 
[between the underlying parties], either before or after judgment[;]” (2) 
over time, the judgment debtor’s financial situation may improve, making 
it possible to pay the judgment, and judgments may typically be executed 
over number of years; (3) having a fact finder render a judgment on the 
merits in a party’s favor is itself an indication that the party’s claim has 
value regardless of collectibility of the underlying judgment; and (4) 
placing the burden to prove collectibility on the plaintiff would be unduly 
burdensome.59  Despite this minority view, most courts today continue to 
view collectibility as part of the legal malpractice plaintiff’s affirmative 
case.60 
IV.     PROOF OF PROXIMATE CAUSE ON THE DEFENSE SIDE: THE 
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE REQUIREMENT 
Plaintiffs who were on the other side of the docket in the underlying 
 
57. See Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that it is not necessary 
for the plaintiff to prove collectibility of the underlying judgment to which he or she was entitled); 
Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20, 31–32 (Alaska 1998) (noting that policy 
favors requiring the defendant attorney to bear the inherent risks and uncertainties of proving 
uncollectibility, because the need to determine collectibility arises only after malpractice has already 
been proven against the attorney); Jourdain v. Dineen, 572 A.2d 1304, 1306 (Me. 1987) (declining 
to adopt a collectibility rule as part of the plaintiff’s affirmative case, holding that “[b]ecause 
uncollectibility of a judgment should be treated as a matter constituting an avoidance or mitigation of 
the consequences of one’s negligent act, it must be pleaded and proved by the defendant”); 
Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington, 506 N.W.2d 275, 278–79 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993) (adopting the minority view “that collectibility is an affirmative defense” to a legal malpractice 
claim that an attorney must plead and prove); Albee Assocs. v. Orloff, Lowenbach, Stifelman & 
Siegel, 721 A.2d 750, 757 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (rejecting the “contention that the issue 
of collectibility cannot be determined prior to entry of a judgment for a specific amount of damages” 
and holding that the plaintiff may prove legal malpractice where the damages in the underlying suit 
are “ascertainable enough”); Kituskie v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) 
(adopting the collectibility requirement as an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendant-
attorney based on the reasoning that the twice-wronged legal malpractice “plaintiff should not have 
the added burden of proving collectibility”). 
58. See Power Constructors, 960 P.2d at 31 (“[P]olicy would seem to militate in favor of 
requiring the malpractice attorney to bear the inherent risks and uncertainties of proving 
uncollectibility.”). 
59. Smith, 868 F. Supp. at 2. 
60. E.g., McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 658 (asserting that despite recognized alternative views, the 
majority of courts continue to place the burden of proving collectibility on the plaintiff in legal 
malpractice cases). 
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case share a similar proof requirement.  Legal malpractice plaintiffs who 
were defendants in the underlying lawsuit must also establish a meritorious 
defense in order to show proximate causation.61  Specifically, courts have 
required the plaintiff establish that he or she had a meritorious defense in 
the underlying suit, and that but for the attorney’s negligence, there would 
have been no judgment, or the judgment would have been for a lesser 
amount.62  “A meritorious defense is one that, if proven, would cause a 
different result upon retrial of the case.”63  Courts have reasoned that no 
malpractice exists unless the lawyer’s negligence resulted in the loss of a 
meritorious defense that would have made a difference in the underlying 
litigation.64  The majority of states place the burden of proving a 
meritorious defense in the underlying lawsuit on the legal malpractice 
 
61. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1916) (explaining the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof); Zarin v. Reid & Priest, 585 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (App. Div. 1992) (indicating the 
plaintiff must prove that he or she would have had a meritorious defense in the underlying lawsuit); 
Heath v. Herron, 732 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied) 
(asserting that the former client needed to prove a meritorious defense that “would [have] cause[d] a 
different result upon retrial of the case” (citations omitted)). 
62. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 402 (concluding that the plaintiff’s complaint did not allege 
facts sufficient to establish liability against the lawyer-defendant because it did not show that the 
plaintiff could have avoided the judgment entered against him or her but for the alleged malpractice); 
United Cmty. Church v. Garcin, 282 Cal. Rptr. 368, 373 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that for the 
attorney-defendant to be ultimately liable for professional negligence, the malpractice plaintiff must 
prove that but for the attorney’s negligence, the plaintiff would not have had an adverse judgment 
rendered against him or her because he or she had a valid defense); Sonnenschine v. Giacomo, 744 
N.Y.S.2d 396, 397–98 (App. Div. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ legal malpractice complaint for 
failure to state a cause of action where the plaintiffs made numerous allegations describing the 
defendant attorneys’ negligence in causing their answer to be stricken, but failed to present any 
argument or proof of the merits of plaintiffs’ defense in the underlying action); Zarin, 585 N.Y.S.2d 
at 381 (applying the but for test, which examines “whether a proper defense would have altered the 
result” of the underlying lawsuit, where the malpractice plaintiff was the defendant in the underlying 
lawsuit (quoting Carmel v. Lunney, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (N.Y. 1987))) (citations omitted); 
Heath, 732 S.W.2d at 753 (“In order to support a malpractice recovery against an attorney, it is 
necessary that the client establish that he had a meritorious defense to the [underlying] suit . . . .”); 
Sherry v. Diercks, 628 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that proximate cause for a 
legal malpractice action requires proof that but for the attorney’s negligence, the client would have 
been successful in defending the underlying action or would have suffered a lesser judgment). 
63. Heath, 732 S.W.2d at 753 (citing Martin v. Allman, 668 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1984, no writ)). 
64. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 402 (concluding that the declaration did not allege facts 
sufficient to establish proximate causation because it did not show that proper prosecution of the case 
would have resulted in no judgment or a judgment for a lesser amount); United Cmty. Church, 282 
Cal. Rptr. at 373 (analyzing the lawyer’s actions using the but for test); Timothy Whelan Law 
Assocs., Ltd. v. Kruppe, 947 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“As defendant failed to 
adequately plead proximate cause, we find that the trial court’s decision to dismiss his claim for legal 
malpractice was not error.”). 
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plaintiff.65 
For example, in Timothy Whelan Law Associates, Ltd. v. Kruppe,66 a legal 
malpractice plaintiff failed to plead that he would have successfully 
opposed the temporary restraining order (TRO) entered against him if his 
lawyers had properly filed an answer.67  The Illinois Court of Appeals held 
that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead and prove proximate cause.68  
Because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of how he would have 
successfully defended against the issuance of the temporary restraining 
order, he failed to show the TRO’s issuance was a result of the lawyer’s 
negligence.69 
The issue of proof of a meritorious defense often arises in the context of 
a default judgment that was entered against the malpractice plaintiff in the 
underlying lawsuit.70  Addressing this situation, the Fourth Circuit held 
that if an attorney fails to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of a client, causing 
a default judgment to be entered the client, it does not automatically 
follow that the client suffered damages.71  The judgment may have been 
warranted, and may ultimately have been entered, notwithstanding any 
efforts by the attorney to prevent it.72  To prevail on a claim for legal 
malpractice, the plaintiff must go a step further and prove that had the 
lawyer executed a proper defense in the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiff 
would have been successful.73 
 
65. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 403 (stating that the burden to prove the damages that were 
suffered based on a meritorious defense in the underlying lawsuit is on the plaintiff); see also George 
S. Mahaffey, Jr., Cause-In-Fact and the Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof with Regard to Causation and 
Damages in Transactional Legal Malpractice Matters: The Necessity of Demonstrating the Better Deal, 37 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 407 (2004) (“The reason that the burden of proof is generally placed on 
the plaintiff is because the plaintiff is asking the court to grant him or her relief.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
66. Timothy Whelan Law Assocs., Ltd. v. Kruppe, 947 N.E.2d 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
67. See id. at 372 (“What is missing is any explanation of how plaintiff would have successfully 
opposed the issuance of the TRO.”). 
68. Id. at 373. 
69. Id. at 372. 
70. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 402 (“The averment is merely that the default judgment would 
not have been rendered if defendants had not failed to appear . . . .”); Sherry v. Diercks, 628 P.2d 
1336, 1339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that the principles of proximate cause require the 
plaintiff to show that if the suit against him had been properly defended, the plaintiff would have 
prevailed or at least achieved a more favorable outcome). 
71. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 402 (reasoning that the court may have rendered the same 
judgment against the client even if the attorney had appeared). 
72. See id. at 403 (“[T]here is a difference between the case of an attorney who fails to do 
anything for his client, and one who makes an inexcusable mistake in attempting to comply with 
instructions . . . .”). 
73. See id. at 402–03 (explaining the plaintiff’s burden of proving a meritorious defense to the 
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V.     THE  “PAYABILITY” REQUIREMENT AND THE COMPETING VIEWS 
The question arises as to whether damages for legal malpractice as a 
result of an adverse judgment against the malpractice plaintiff should 
include the amount of an adverse judgment that the plaintiff will never 
have to pay.  Discussion of a “payability” requirement to establish 
proximate causation relates back to the competing views on the judgment 
rule versus the payment rule. 
A. Judgment Rule Versus Payment Rule 
The debate regarding the judgment rule versus the payment rule 
typically comes up in the context of the liability of an insurer for entry of a 
judgment in excess of policy limits as a result of bad faith settlement 
practices.74  In that context, under the majority judgment rule, the entry 
of an adverse judgment is by itself sufficient to bring an action for breach 
of duty, regardless of whether any money has been paid or the judgment is 
ultimately collectible.75 
The majority-view courts have expressed several reasons for adopting the 
judgment rule.  First, the judgment rule discourages “bad-faith 
[settlement] practices in the insurance industry by eliminating the insurer’s 
ability to hide behind the financial status of its insured.”76  If the rule 
required payment of the judgment or proof of the ability to make 
payment, “an insurer may be encouraged to refuse to settle a claim merely 
because the insured is insolvent[,]” discouraging the poor from using 
insurance.77  “[T]he judgment rule prevents an insurer from benefitting 
 
underlying lawsuit); see also George S. Mahaffey, Jr., Cause-In-Fact and the Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof 
with Regard to Causation and Damages in Transactional Legal Malpractice Matters: The Necessity of 
Demonstrating the Better Deal, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 406–07 (2004) (discussing the burdens 
of proof on a plaintiff with regard to cause-in-fact damages in a transactional legal malpractice 
action). 
74. See Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 423–24 (5th Cir. 2007) (comparing views of other 
jurisdictions with regard to the judgment rule in a legal malpractice case); Shipman v. Kruck, 593 
S.E.2d 319, 326 (Va. 2004) (identifying issues concerning adoption of the payment rule versus the 
judgment rule). 
75. See Stanley, 500 F.3d at 424–25 (“[T]he viability of a legal malpractice claim should not 
depend on the ability of the victim to satisfy all or part of a judgment against him.”); Gray v. Grain 
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acknowledging “a split of authority 
among the states as to the extent of an insurance company’s liability to the assignee of its insured for a 
claim above the policy limit,” but adhering to the majority judgment rule).  But see Shipman, 593 
S.E.2d at 325–27 (discussing the problematic nature in applying the payment rule of legal 
malpractice actions). 
76. Pistalo v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 
Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). 
77. Id. (quoting Econ. Fire, 643 N.E.2d at 385). 
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from poverty of an insured who has a meritorious claim but cannot first 
pay the judgment imposed upon [him or her].”78  In addition, it would be 
wrong for an insurer to ignore its responsibility to operate in good faith 
with respect to its insured client merely because the client is insolvent.79  
Finally, the payment rule, which adopts the opposite view, unfairly 
assumes that the insolvent—or its estate, which may be insolvent at the 
time the judgment is entered—will remain insolvent for the life of the 
judgment.80  Despite these policy reasons to protect insured individuals, 
courts have recognized that a bankrupt or insolvent insured “presents the 
most difficult challenge to the integrity of the judgment rule.”81 
The minority view favors the payment rule—also called the prepayment 
rule—which provides that damages are limited to the amount of the 
judgment paid or payable by the judgment debtor.82  For example, at one 
time Virginia followed the payment rule.83  In Allied Productions v. 
Duesterdick,84 based on the well-established principle that an attorney is 
liable only for the injury actually suffered by the client, the Supreme Court 
of Virginia held that “when a client has suffered a judgment for money 
damages as the proximate result of his lawyer’s negligence such judgment 
constitutes actual damages recoverable in a suit for legal malpractice only 
to the extent such judgment has been paid.”85  In 2004, the Virginia 
Supreme Court overruled Allied Productions, citing three perceived 
problems with the payment rule.86  First, under the payment rule the 
aggrieved client could intentionally delay the running of the statute of 
limitations for its malpractice claim simply by deferring payment of the 
 
78. Id. (quoting Econ. Fire, 643 N.E.2d at 385) (identifying further benefits of the judgment 
rule).  
79. See Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ohio 1981) (finding that the 
judgment rule better serves the interest of justice). 
80. See id. (comparing the effects of applying the payment rule with the effects of applying the 
judgment rule). 
81. Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
82. See Levantino v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1979) 
(characterizing the payment rule as the “earlier and now generally discredited view of damages in bad 
faith cases”). 
83. See Allied Prods. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Va. 1977) (“[W]e hold that . . . 
such judgment constitutes actual damages recoverable in a suit for legal malpractice only to the extent 
such judgment has been paid.”), overruled by Shipman v. Kruck, 593 S.E.2d 319 (Va. 2004). 
84. Allied Prods. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774 (Va. 1977), overruled by Shipman v. Kruck, 
593 S.E.2d 319 (Va. 2004). 
85. Id. at 776. 
86. See Shipman v. Kruck, 593 S.E.2d 319, 326 (Va. 2004) (reversing the appellate court due 
to the attested problems with the holding that the payment rule applies). 
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judgment.87  Second, the court found that “in a statute of limitations 
context, [the payment rule] would work an injustice on attorneys who may 
be forced to defend allegations of malpractice brought many years after the 
alleged breach occurred, dependent entirely upon the ability or whim of 
the complaining client to pay the resulting damages.”88  In addition, the 
payment rule may lead to a situation where “the greater the injury 
wrongfully inflicted, the less the liability of the wrongdoer.”89 
Today, it is not clear whether any state strictly follows the payment rule.  
However, several states have adopted a modified form of the payment rule.  
In Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company v. Keeley,90 the Michigan 
Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court’s decision that the insurer’s bad 
faith did not cause the excess judgment entered against its insured, decided 
to resolve the excess-judgment issue that had been presented in the case.91  
Although the Michigan Supreme Court had endorsed the judgment rule in 
its earlier opinion, it subsequently adopted a compromise between the 
judgment rule and the payment rule as set forth by Justice Levin in his 
dissent in the prior opinion.92  Specifically, Justice Levin in his dissenting 
opinion proposed the following compromise:  
[T]hat this Court accept the essence of the judgment rule by eliminating the 
need to show partial payment [as a prerequisite to a lawsuit for bad-faith 
settlement practices], but provide protection for insurers along the lines of 
the prepayment rule by precluding collection on the judgment from the 
insurer beyond what is or would be actually collectable from the insured.93  
Justice Levin also advocated for a recovery to the extent that the insured 
could show economic loss in the form of damaged credit or financial 
consequences.94  Following a remand to the trial court, the Michigan 
Supreme Court adopted this modified payment rule as the better measure 
 
87. See id. (“[A]dherence to a payment rule would vest the aggrieved client with the power to 
forestall the running of the statute of limitations by the deferral of payment . . . .”). 
88. Id.  
89. Id. (quoting Allied Prods. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774, 777 (Va. 1977) (Poff, J., 
dissenting)). 
90. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 461 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1990). 
91. See id. at 667 (affirming the trial court’s decision denying that any bad faith by the insurer 
caused harm to the insured). 
92. See id. (holding that Justice Levin’s dissent was the best approach to determine the issue of 
whether insurers are liable in cases of excess judgment). 
93. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 447 N.W.2d 691, 709 (Mich. 1989) (Levin, J., 
dissenting), withdrawn, 461 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1990). 
94. See id. at 706 (“If Keeley could demonstrate that his credit had been damaged or he had 
suffered financial ruin, then he should no doubt recover for such economic loss caused by breach of 
contract.”). 
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of an insurer’s liability for an excess judgment resulting from bad faith 
settlement practices.95 
New York has also adopted a modified version of the two competing 
rules, depending on the circumstances in which the judgment rule or 
payment rule may be applied.96  The New York county court in Levantino 
v. Insurance Company of North America97 articulated the rule as follows:  
1) [W]here the assured pays part of the judgment or is solvent enough to do 
so at the time of the excess judgment, the judgment rule applies and he is 
entitled to the full amount of the excess as his damages; 2) where he was 
insolvent before the judgment and obtained a bankruptcy discharge after it, 
he is not damaged and may not recover for it; and 3) where he was insolvent 
or nearly insolvent prior to the judgment the jury must consider his past, his 
prospects, and other economic factors and assess his damages.98  
In adopting this modified rule, the New York court recognized that a 
judgment debtor who was insolvent before the excess judgment was 
entered, and subsequently obtained a discharge in bankruptcy for the 
amount of the judgment, has not been harmed in the amount of the excess 
judgment by the bad faith practices of the insurer.99 
Courts have focused on several distinguishing factors in adopting the 
judgment rule for bad faith insurance cases.  First, bad faith actions against 
an insurance company arise out of a contract where there is an attempt to 
put the injured party back in its original position before the breach.100  In 
addition, bad faith insurance cases involve a third party, the judgment 
creditor, who was harmed by the acts or omissions of the insured.101  In 
enforcing the judgment rule, there is an underlying assumption that the 
“holder of the former judgment” will be a party to the subsequent bad 
faith suit against the insurer or will otherwise seek to “protect his interests 
prior to payment of the second judgment” such that the insured will not 
receive a windfall.102  Finally, in the insurance context, there is a concern 
 
95. See Keeley, 461 N.W.2d at 667 (adopting Justice Levin’s proposition of a hybrid of the 
payment and judgment rules). 
96. See Levantino v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999–1002 (Sup. Ct. 1979) 
(discussing the circumstances giving rise to different applications of the judgment rule). 
97. Levantino v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
98. Id. at 1002. 
99. See id. at 1001 (declaring that being insolvent before judgment is rendered nullifies any 
injury from the judgment). 
100. See Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ohio 1981) (hesitating to 
relieve an insurer from his or her contractual duty of good faith). 
101. E.g., Levantino, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (noting that the action against the insurer was 
brought by the insured’s creditor). 
102. See Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 464 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1971) (assuming 
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that adoption of the payment rule will encourage bad faith settlement 
practices by insurance carriers.103 
B. McClarty v. Gudenau 
In 1995, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan decided a case that sparked discussion and controversy around 
the country regarding whether courts should adopt a requirement similar 
to the payment rule for legal malpractice cases involving an adverse 
judgment against the former client.104  In McClarty v. Gudenau, a 
Chapter Seven bankruptcy trustee brought a legal malpractice action “on 
behalf of the Debtor and her bankruptcy estate” alleging malpractice in 
connection with the lawyer’s representation of the debtor in a negligence 
case.105  As a result of the underlying lawsuit, the debtor had a $1 million 
judgment entered against her, which, after payment by the insurance 
company, left her with $750,000 of personal liability.106  This “personal 
exposure” caused the judgment debtor to file for bankruptcy, in which she 
later received a discharge of the debt.107  The lawyer “[d]efendants moved 
for summary judgment[,]” arguing that the debtor’s bankruptcy discharge 
nullified her damage claim for $750,000 as part of the unsatisfied 
judgment.108 
The Michigan District Court recognized that the issue before it was one 
of first impression and focused, for purposes of its analysis, on the 
proximate cause element of a legal malpractice claim, which requires proof 
of actual damages suffered by the wronged litigant.109  The court agreed 
with the lawyer-defendants, holding that as a result of the discharge in 
bankruptcy, “the [d]ebtor no longer suffer[ed] from the excess 
 
the likelihood of a holder of a former judgment bringing an action to protect his assets.). 
103. See, e.g., Pistalo v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) 
(“The rationale behind allowing full recovery to an insured who has not paid the excess judgment is 
to prevent bad-faith practices in the insurance industry by eliminating the insurer’s ability to hide 
behind the financial status of its insured.” (quoting Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643 N.E.2d 
382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994))). 
104. McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788 at 789–90 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995). 
105. Id. at 789. 
106. See id. (discussing the liability imposed on the plaintiff in the automobile negligence suit). 
107. See id. (describing the “exposure which prompted [the debtor’s] filing of bankruptcy” and 
the later discharge of the debt). 
108. See id. at 789–90 (noting the defendant’s previously denied motion for summary 
judgment and the defendant’s position). 
109. See id. at 790 (acknowledging the “novelty of this issue” and later the need to prove 
“actual damages suffered by the tort victim”). 
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judgment.”110  Accordingly, the court held that the bankruptcy trustee, 
standing in the shoes of the debtor, could not prove damages in the 
amount of the excess judgment, because the debtor no longer owed 
anything as a result of the bankruptcy discharge.111 
The court supported its conclusion with an analysis on “the law the 
Court and the parties have been able to find on the effect of a discharge on 
legal malpractice damages available to a bankruptcy trustee . . . .”112  First, 
in In re R.H.N. Realty Corporation,113 the Southern District of New York 
held that where “a Chapter seven trustee brought suit against a partnership 
seeking indemnification for a judgment owed by the debtor[,]” the trustee 
did not have a valid indemnification claim because the debtor had not 
paid, nor would he ever have to pay, the judgment in a no-asset case.114  
The court noted that the trustee was “simply attempting to collect the 
deficiency claim” for the benefit of the judgment debtor, which did not 
come within the trustee’s duties under the bankruptcy code.115  Second, 
the McClarty court cited Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company v. 
Keeley, wherein the court adopted the modified judgment rule articulated 
by the dissent in its earlier opinion, and held that “recovery against an 
insurer for bad faith” settlement practices is “limited to the amount of the 
judgment actually collectible against the insured[.]”116 
Finally, the court analyzed a New York case wherein the court took a 
similar position.117  In Murphy v. Stein,118 the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant attorney committed “malpractice by failing to detect [a] 
discrepancy between the court’s memorandum decision and the judgment 
submitted[,]” with regard to the income gained from the sale of his marital 
property as part of his divorce.119  The judgment incorrectly ordered 
 
110. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2012)). 
111. See id. (noting that “the [d]ebtor no longer suffered from the excess judgment” as a result 
of the bankruptcy discharge). 
112. Id. 
113. In re R.H.N. Realty Corp., 84 B.R. 356 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
114. See McClarty, 176 B.R. at 790–91 (citing R.H.N. Realty Corp., 84 B.R. at 360–61) 
(analyzing the holding in In re R.H.N Realty Corp., where a trustee did not have a valid claim for 
indemnification of a judgment). 
115. See id. at 791 (quoting R.H.N. Realty Corp., 84 B.R. at 361) (indicating that the collection 
of a deficiency claim does not fall within a trustee’s duties under the bankruptcy code). 
116. McClarty, 176 B.R. at 791 (citing Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 461 N.W.2d 
666, 667 (Mich. 1990)). 
117. See id. (citing Murphy v. Stein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1989)) (discussing other 
forms of support for the proposition that a deficiency claim collection is not a function of a trustee). 
118. Murphy v. Stein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1989). 
119. Id. at 54. 
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expenses to be incurred by the plaintiff’s income from the sale.120  Relying 
on the flawed divorce judgment, the plaintiff sold his equity interest in the 
house for $1,500.121  The plaintiff then filed for bankruptcy from which 
he later received a discharge.122  In the subsequent malpractice action 
against his divorce attorney, the plaintiff sought damages claiming he sold 
his equity interest in the house for far less than it was worth based upon 
the attorney’s error.123  The court held that as a result of the bankruptcy 
discharge, the plaintiff had “not suffered the requisite ‘actual damages’” to 
prove proximate causation.124  The court stated just the opposite—the 
plaintiff suffered no damages as a result of the alleged malpractice because, 
“by virtue of the sale of his equity interest”—in the amount of $1,500—
and the bankruptcy discharge—of approximately $21,000 in debts—the 
plaintiff actually received a benefit in excess of “his alleged interest in the 
marital premises.”125  The McClarty court held that these three cases 
supported its holding that a “[d]ebtor’s discharge from bankruptcy 
mitigated” the debtor’s damages for any malpractice by the lawyers.126 
In reaching its decision, the McClarty court recognized there were a 
couple of cases that could support the bankruptcy trustee’s position and 
thus quickly distinguished those cases.127  First, in Camp v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Insurance Company,128 St. Paul contended that its liability for 
an excess judgment, as the result of bad faith settlement practices, was 
extinguished by virtue of the insured’s discharge in bankruptcy from the 
$3 million medical malpractice judgment entered against their doctor.129  
The court rejected St. Paul’s argument on the grounds that “St. Paul’s duty 
[of good faith] extended to the bankruptcy estate and the estate was 
damaged by St. Paul’s failure to settle within the policy limits . . . .”130  In 
particular, the court focused on language in the doctor’s insurance policy, 
which stated St. Paul would still be obligated under the policy if the 
insured went bankrupt, to support its finding that St. Paul “assumed a 
 
120. See id. (acknowledging that the defendant attorney failed to correct the error made in his 




124. Id. at 55. 
125. See id. (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorney). 
126. See McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788, 791–92 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (supporting 
the notion that a bankruptcy discharge would mitigate a debtor’s damages for legal malpractice). 
127. See id. at 792 (distinguishing cases that were arguably supportive of the trustee’s position). 
128. Camp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1993). 
129. Id. at 14. 
130. Id. at 15. 
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duty to the bankruptcy estate.”131  The McClarty court found specific 
language in the insurance policy to be the “crucial distinction” between 
Camp and the case before the court.132  In contrast to Camp, the lawyer-
defendants in McClarty had in no way assumed a duty to the debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate.133  Accordingly, while the excess judgment remained 
with the bankruptcy estate, the trustee could not recover the excess 
judgment as damages against the lawyer-defendants through an action 
brought solely on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.134 
The McClarty court also analyzed Green v. Welsh.135  In Green, the 
Second Circuit allowed a tort claimant to pursue her negligence claim 
against the discharged bankruptcy debtors, but the action was limited to 
recovering a judgment against the insurance carrier.136  In making its 
decision, the circuit court relied on the language in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a): “A 
discharge in a case under this title—(1) voids any judgment at any time 
obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the 
personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged 
. . . .”137  The purpose of the bankruptcy discharge is to give the debtor a 
fresh start, but not to afford anyone else a similar benefit.138  The 
McClarty court distinguished Green on the grounds that the extent of the 
defendant-insurer’s liability was based on an amount set by an insurance 
policy, as opposed to legal malpractice actions where the defendant-lawyer 
is liable for the claimant’s actual damages proximately caused by the 
lawyer’s negligence.139 
The court in McClarty noted that its holding did not preclude the 
bankruptcy debtor from recovering “damage for [harm to] her credit and 
emotional injuries” as a result of filing for bankruptcy.140  Those are the 
damages the debtor would be entitled to, in addition to the discharge, for a 
 
131. Id. 
132. McClarty, 176 B.R. at 792. 
133. See id. (differentiating the instant case due to lack of an assumed duty or relationship 
between the parties). 
134. See id. (holding that the defendant attorney owed no duty to the plaintiff trustee relating 
to any monetary judgment not in the plaintiff’s possession). 
135. Green v. Welsh, 956 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1992). 
136. See id. at 32 (“Green could resume her suit against the Welshes as long as it was directed 
only at obtaining a judgment to be paid by the Welshes’ liability insurer.”). 
137. Id. at 33 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2012)) (emphasis omitted). 
138. See id. (stating that a bankruptcy discharge is only intended to benefit debtors). 
139. See McClarty, 176 B.R. at 792 (“Green is different from this case, however, because the 
extent of Defendants’ malpractice liability to the trustee as an ‘insurer’ of the Debtor is . . . the 
Debtor’s actual damages—not an amount set in an insurance policy or other indemnity agreement.”).  
140. Id. at 793. 
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make-whole-type remedy.141  However, the court was simply unwilling to 
ignore the bankruptcy filing and its discharge to determine the debtor’s 
recoverable damages for the alleged malpractice.142  Thus, McClarty 
stands for the proposition that a plaintiff may not recover the amount of a 
judgment that has been discharged in bankruptcy and that the plaintiff will 
never have to pay as a result as damages for a legal malpractice claim. 
Since the Michigan court’s decision, McClarty has been distinguished as 
a case discussing limitations on liabilities for debts owed to third parties.  
For example, in McHale v. Silicon Valley Law Group,143 a 1031144 
exchange company claimed damages of $18 million in cash inflows used to 
close 1031 exchange transactions of new clients, which resulted in 
insufficient cash flow to meet the commitments of subsequent 1031 
exchangers.145  The law firm relied on McClarty and other third-party 
liability cases to argue that those cash inflows did not result in any liability 
to the plaintiff and that such liability had been extinguished as a result of 
the entity’s filing for bankruptcy.146  The court found that the plaintiff 
did have a liability to repay those funds and distinguished McClarty as a 
case that discussed limitations on liabilities to third parties.147  In the 
McHale case, the plaintiff owned the lost exchange funds and thus suffered 
a distinct injury when he was stripped of those assets and could no longer 
fulfill his obligations to the exchangers.148  Therefore, the court held the 
 
141. Id.  
142. See id. (underlining the Court’s unwillingness to ignore the bankruptcy discharge when 
evaluating damages). 
143. McHale v. Silicon Valley Law Grp., No. 10-CV-04864-JCS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
100798, 2013 WL 3784349 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2013). 
144. Like-Kind Exchanges Under IRC Code Section 1031, IRS (last updated Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Like-Kind-Exchanges-Under-IRC-Code-Section-1031 (“Whenever you sell 
business or investment property and you have a gain, you generally have to pay tax on the gain at the 
time of sale.  IRC Section 1031 provides an exception and allows you to postpone paying tax on the 
gain if you reinvest the proceeds in similar property as part of a qualifying like-kind exchange.”). 
145. See McHale, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100798,. at *4–5, 2013 WL 3784349, at *2 (“The 
parties have stipulated that 1031 Advance did not have sufficient assets remaining to meet the 
obligations of the subsequent 1031 Advance exchangers or the other 1031 Debtors and their clients, 
and that ‘1031 Advance had liabilities to repay those funds.’”). 
146. See id. at *9-10, 2013 WL 3784349, at *3 (explaining that the defendant lawyer’s position 
that liability for inflows had been extinguished due to the entity filing for bankruptcy). 
147. See id. at *10, 2013 WL 3784349, at *3–4 (emphasizing that the plaintiff had an 
obligation to pay debts to its own clients and that McClarty was distinguishable because that case 
discussed limitations on liabilities to third parties). 
148. See id. at *8, 2013 WL 3784349, at *3 (“[T]he trustee [did] not seek to recover money 
owed to the other 1031 Debtors or their clients; at the time 1031 Advance filed for bankruptcy, it 
had a deficit of approximately $31.2 million in exchange funds that it needed to close exchanges for 
its own clients.”).  
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plaintiff could offer evidence of the lost funds as damages for its legal 
malpractice claim.149  Notably, the court in McHale did not determine 
whether the law firm’s conduct was the proximate cause of the loss of the 
plaintiff’s assets, but only whether the plaintiff could claim as damages the 
lost assets and put on evidence related thereto.150 
C. Stanley v. Trinchard 
In 2007, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar fact 
pattern and rejected the McClarty court’s reasoning and decision in Stanley 
v. Trinchard.151  Stanley has since become the seminal counterpart case to 
McClarty on the issue of whether legal malpractice plaintiffs (or a 
bankruptcy trustee standing in their shoes) may pursue a damage claim in 
the amount of a judgment that was discharged in bankruptcy.152  In 
Stanley, Hale, a Louisiana detective working for a Sheriff’s office, had a 
multi-million dollar judgment entered against him as a result of a § 1983 
civil suit.153  After a judgment creditor forced Hale into an involuntary 
bankruptcy, he received a discharge of the bankruptcy and brought suit 
against the lawyers who represented him in the § 1983 action.154  The 
lawyer-defendants filed for summary judgment, arguing that as a result of 
Hale’s discharge in bankruptcy, he could not prove damages for his legal 
malpractice claim.155 
Hale sought damages in the amount of the multi-million dollar 
judgment entered against him, as well as general damages for “the physical 
and emotional stress of [being in] trial; the shock of having [the] judgment 
 
149. See id. at *12–13, 2013 WL 3784349, at *4 (holding that in a legal malpractice claim, the 
plaintiff could present evidence to prove lost funds were proximately caused by the defendant’s 
negligent acts). 
150. See id. at *13, 2013 WL 3784349, at *4 (emphasizing that while the defendant had not 
offered evidence of causation, this was a question of fact for the fact finder). 
151. See Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2007) (addressing whether the 
trustee for Hale’s estate could pursue a malpractice action against the attorneys who represented Hale 
in the prior case based on a judgment for which Hale had received a discharge in bankruptcy). 
152. See id. at 425 (“[W]e hold that . . . [the debtor] had incurred a legal injury . . . sufficient 
to allow [the trustee] to assert a legal malpractice claim . . . and that [the debtor’s] subsequent 
discharge from personal liability for that judgment had no effect on the right and duty of the trustee 
to pursue that claim.”). 
153. See id. at 415–17 (summarizing the prior civil suit filed by a convicted murderer alleging 
that exculpatory evidence had not been disclosed in his trial, which resulted in a $4,000,000 
judgment against Hale). 
154. Id. at 418. 
155. See id. (explaining that the district court concluded “Hale’s bankruptcy discharge made it 
impossible for Stanley to show that any damages resulted from the . . . defendants’ alleged 
malpractice” and thus granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment). 
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rendered against him; and the humiliation” of having to file for 
bankruptcy.156  Citing McClarty, the defendants argued that summary 
judgment was proper because there was no injury to support a malpractice 
claim as a result of the bankruptcy discharge.157  In response, the 
bankruptcy trustee argued that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re 
Segerstrom158 rejected McClarty.159 
In earlier proceedings, the district court declined to follow McClarty 
based on the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in In re Segerstrom and In re 
Edgeworth,160 in which the court held that a “bankruptcy [discharge] 
discharges only the debtor’s personal liability for his discharged debts but 
does not extinguish the debt itself . . . .”161  Relying on this precedent, the 
district court denied summary judgment on the grounds that Hale had 
suffered no damages as a result of the discharge.162  Despite this ruling, 
the district court then granted summary judgment in accordance with 
Louisiana law because the reasons for the bankruptcy discharge were 
indistinguishable from McClarty.163  In granting summary judgment 
under Louisiana law, the district court noted that Hale’s bankruptcy 
discharge relieved him of personal liability for the judgment entered 
against him.164  Additionally, Hale had produced no evidence of any lost 
assets or payments made as a result of the judgment entered against 
him.165  Consequently, the district court held that Hale had not suffered 
any kind of economic loss as a result of his lawyer’s alleged malpractice.166  
 
156. Stanley v. Trinchard, No. 02-1235, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at *31, 2005 WL 
2037543, at *9 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2005), rev’d, 500 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2007). 
157. See id. at *10, 2005 WL 2037543, at *3 (citing McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788, 790 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995)) (supporting the view that a bankruptcy discharge bars a debtor from 
recovering damages for a discharged judgment in a malpractice suit). 
158. In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2001). 
159. See Stanley, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at *10–11, 2005 WL 2037543, at *3 
(outlining the trustee’s argument that the debtor’s discharge did not limit the right to bring a 
malpractice suit and that the discharge does not eliminate the debt).  
160. In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1993). 
161. Stanley, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at *13, 2005 WL 2037543, at *3–4. 
162. Id., 2005 WL 2037543, at *4. 
163. See id. at *42–43, 2005 WL 2037543, at *13 (finding that the plaintiff failed to meet his 
burden of proving the last element of his legal malpractice claim such that summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants was proper). 
164. Id. at *34–35, 2005 WL 2037543, at *11. 
165. Id., 2005 WL 2037543, at *11. 
166. Id. at *35, 2005 WL 2037543, at *11.  In reaching its decision, the court cited Costello v. 
Hardy in support of its holding.  See id. at *32–34, 2005 WL 2037543, at *10 (citing Costello v. 
Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 133 (La. 2004)) (explaining that in drafting a will for a son, the drafting 
attorney negligently failed to include a $25,000 annual stipend the son intended to leave for the 
mother).  In Costello v. Hardy, through settlement of the suit to annul the will, which the attorney 
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Furthermore, the court found no causal connection between the alleged 
malpractice and Hale’s alleged emotional distress and mental anguish 
claims.167  The Louisiana court held that because Hale could not meet his 
burden of proof with respect to proximate cause and damages, summary 
judgment was warranted for the defendants.168 
In reviewing this decision, the Fifth Circuit cited bankruptcy law stating 
that a bankruptcy trustee “may pursue any claims that are property of the 
bankruptcy estate.”169  The bankruptcy trustee then stands in the shoes of 
the debtor and “is subject to all defenses available against the debtor, and 
must prove all elements that the debtor would be required to prove.”170  
Because Hale’s legal malpractice claim accrued pre-petition, his 
malpractice claim became property of the bankruptcy estate, and could 
properly be pursued by the bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the estate.171 
The Fifth Circuit recognized the Michigan Bankruptcy Court’s holding 
in McClarty, but declined to follow it.172  Instead, the court looked to its 
prior decision in In re Segerstrom as the proper authority on this issue.173  
In In re Segerstrom, the court entered a judgment of $8.5 million against a 
personal injury defendant involved in a car wreck.174  After the judgment 
creditor filed an involuntary bankruptcy action against Segerstrom, the 
court granted the trustee’s motion to hire special counsel to pursue a legal 
malpractice claim against Segerstrom’s lawyers in a state court lawsuit.175  
 
had allegedly negligently prepared, Mrs. Costello was entitled to a $25,000 annual stipend, which 
compromised and discharged her claim for the $25,000 annual stipend that was allegedly omitted 
from the will.  Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 138–39 (La. 2004).  Because Mrs. Costello only 
claimed damages for the annual stipend in the legal malpractice action, the court of appeals granted 
summary judgment, which the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, in favor of the lawyer-defendants.  
Id. at 139. 
167. See Stanley, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at *41, 2005 WL 2037543, at *13 (asserting 
that because the trustee could not provide evidence of Hale’s emotional distress or mental anguish 
resulting from the multi-million dollar judgment, Hale had not satisfied all the elements of a legal 
malpractice claim).  
168. Id. at *43, 2005 WL 2037543, at *13. 
169. Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2012)). 
170. Id. (quoting In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d, 218, 224 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
171. Id. at 418–19.  
172. See id. at 419–20 (holding that “a trustee of [a] bankruptcy estate of a discharged debtor” 
cannot recover the amount of the judgment for which the debtor received a discharge as damages for 
a legal malpractice claim. (citing McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995))). 
173. See id. at 420 (noting how the facts in In re Segerstrom were parallel to the facts in the 
present case). 
174. See In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2001) (providing the background of a 
car wreck case, which resulted in an excess judgment and an involuntary bankruptcy suit filed against 
the defendant). 
175. See id. at 221–22 (discussing the bankruptcy estate’s malpractice complaint “alleging 
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Eight months after the bankruptcy filing, Segerstrom received a discharge 
in the bankruptcy.176  This led the district court to grant the defendant-
lawyer’s motion for summary judgment for lack of proximate cause and 
injury.177 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment on lack of proximate 
causation and injury on grounds unrelated to Segerstrom’s bankruptcy 
discharge.178  Specifically, after declining to follow McClarty, the court 
looked to “whether the [bankruptcy] estate has offered sufficient evidence 
that Segerstrom, as opposed to her creditors, suffered injury in the 
[underlying] litigation.”179  The court found that the bankruptcy estate 
had failed to prove a meritorious defense that would have made a 
difference in the underlying lawsuit or any injury to Segerstrom, to meet 
its burden of proof on the third and fourth elements of its legal malpractice 
claim.180  The Fifth Circuit discussed, as dicta, the law firm’s argument 
that Segerstrom was not damaged in the amount of the judgment for 
which she had received a discharge in bankruptcy.181  While not 
controlling, the In re Segerstrom court cited its prior decision in In re 
Edgeworth, holding that “a discharged debt continues to exist [thereafter] 
and judgment creditors may collect from any other [liable] source.”182  It 
also found the policy argument relevant in Edgeworth, that tortfeasors 
should not be able “to escape liability simply based on the financial 
 
negligence, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty”). 
176. Id. at 222. 
177. See id. at 222–23 (explaining that the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants, because any negligence by the defendants “did not cause Segerstrom injury because 
her personal liability on the state court judgment had been discharged”). 
178. See id. at 227 & n.6 (expounding on the bankruptcy court’s failure to prove injury or 
causation without considering bankruptcy proceedings).  In the underlying lawsuit, Segerstrom, a 
minor at the time of the car accident, made “the strategic decision to accept responsibility for the 
accident . . . .”  Id. at 226.  The court found that the bankruptcy estate failed to produce any 
evidence suggesting Segerstrom did not achieve the exact outcome she pursued in the litigation to 
prove she had suffered any injury as a result of the alleged malpractice.  Id.  In addition, the 
bankruptcy estate failed to prove that its alternative trial strategy would have been successful (the 
meritorious defense requirement) in the underlying litigation to establish causation.  Id. at 226–27. 
179. See id. at 226 (disagreeing with the court in McClarty and considering whether the 
individual’s estate suffered any injury).  
180. See id. at 226–27 (reinforcing the fact that the estate had failed to prove their case). 
181. See id. at 225 n.4 (refusing to adopt the district court’s holding that the bankruptcy 
trustee would not have been able to prove damages as a result of the discharge of the debt). 
182. See id. (citing In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1993)) (explaining that the 
family of a deceased who had died under a doctor’s care could pursue a malpractice claim even 
though the doctor had filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) 
(2012) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the 
property of any other entity for, such debt.”). 
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misfortunes of the insured victims.”183 
In Stanley, the Fifth Circuit noted that while the court was not strictly 
required to follow its prior holding in In re Segerstrom, it made sense to do 
so.184  In support of its decision, the court cited the following policy 
reasons: “(1) it would be improper to excuse the malpractice liability of a 
potentially negligent attorney because of the ‘financial misfortunes’” of his 
former client, and (2) permitting a claim for legal malpractice to go 
forward despite a “bankruptcy discharge would not threaten ‘the primary 
purpose behind the discharge,’ i.e., avoiding financial harm to the 
debtor.”185  Of significance, the Stanley court made a distinction between 
the claim by Hale individually and the claim by the bankruptcy trustee on 
behalf of his bankruptcy estate, describing it as the very distinction 
underlying the court’s opinion in In re Segerstrom.186  Specifically, the 
court held, “The fact that Hale was later discharged from personal liability 
for his judgment debt had no legal effect on Stanley’s right and duty to 
continue pursuing that claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.”187  
Thus, Hale’s discharge of the debt, after the filing of the bankruptcy and 
after the legal malpractice claim, had already transferred to the bankruptcy 
estate upon the filing of the bankruptcy, and thus did not affect “the right 
and duty of the [bankruptcy] trustee to pursue that claim.”188 
Today, these two opinions—McClarty and Stanley—represent a divided 
jurisprudence on this important issue for legal malpractice actions. 
VI.     AVOIDING MALPRACTICE IN A VACUUM: THE WISDOM OF 
ADOPTING THE PAYABILITY REQUIREMENT 
Proof of actual damages as a result of the attorney’s negligence is a key 
element of a legal malpractice claim.189  Courts have stepped up the 
burden of proof by requiring legal malpractice plaintiffs to provide 
evidence of collectibility of the lost judgment in order to prevail.190  On 
 
183. Segerstrom, 247 F.3d at 225 n.4 (quoting In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 54 (5th Cir. 
1993)). 
184. See Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 2007) (clarifying that while this 
court was not required to rule in the same manner as its earlier decision, there was no reason not to). 
185. Id. at 420–21 (quoting In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
186. See id. at 421 (separating the interests of the individual from those of the bankruptcy 
estate). 
187. Id. at 422.  
188. Id. at 425. 
189. See Jackson v. Urban, 516 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (requiring proof of a collectible award before the legal malpractice plaintiff could 
succeed). 
190. Gibson v. Johnson, 414 S.W.2d 235, 238–39 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1967, writ ref’d 
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the defense side, the plaintiff must prove an available meritorious defense 
in the underlying lawsuit that would have precipitated a different result 
but for the lawyer’s negligence.191  However, in the latter situation, courts 
need to go a step further.  As the corresponding burden of proof to 
collectibility, it seems only logical and fair that a legal malpractice plaintiff 
who was a defendant in the underlying action (and is consequently now a 
judgment debtor) should also have to prove payability of the adverse 
judgment to recover the amount of the judgment as damages for legal 
malpractice.  In the legal malpractice arena, “mere negligence on the part 
of an attorney is not sufficient to impose liability” upon him.192  
Furthermore, such negligence constitutes “malpractice in a vacuum” when 
considered without the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.193  
Rather, the policy behind the suit-within-a-suit doctrine is that a former 
client will prevail in a legal malpractice action only upon proof that “the 
attorney’s negligence ‘made a difference to the client.’”194  This relates 
back to “the fundamental rules of damages,” that a wronged litigant may 
not recover “damages in the absence of a showing with certainty that actual 
damages were, in fact, sustained.”195  The client-plaintiff in a legal 
malpractice action must show appreciable harm in order to recover.196  
Thus, proof of collectibility, or on the flip side, payability, is a critical 
component of establishing proximate causation for a legal malpractice 
claim. 
In requiring proof of collectibility, courts have recognized that it would 
be inequitable for a malpractice plaintiff to obtain a judgment against the 
lawyer greater than what the plaintiff could have recovered and put in his 
or her pocket as a result of the underlying lawsuit.197  In the same light, it 
 
n.r.e.) (holding that a client who sued his former attorney for malpractice for mishandling a prior 
cause of action had the burden of proof to show he would have been successful in his prior suit and 
that any judgment rendered would have been collectible). 
191. See, e.g., Schneider v. Richardson, 411 A.2d 656, 658 (Me. 1979) (citing Sohn v. 
Bernstein, 279 A.2d 529, 532 (Me. 1971)) (stating that in order to prevail in a legal malpractice 
action, the plaintiff must prove a certain probability of success but for the attorney’s negligent actions 
or lack thereof). 
192. Id.  
193. See id. (explaining why malpractice without damages or injuries is a fruitless cause of 
action). 
194. Best v. Rome, 858 F. Supp. 271, 277 (D. Mass. 1994) (quoting Jernigan v. Giard, 500 
N.E.2d 806, 807 (Mass. 1986)). 
195. Coon v. Ginsberg, 509 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Colo. App. 1973). 
196. Kituskie v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. Super. 1996). 
197. See id. (“The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, 
speculative harm, or the threat of future harm—not yet realized—does not suffice to create a cause of 
action for negligence.” (quoting Ammon v. McCloskey, 665 A.2d 549, 552 (Pa. Super. 1995))). 
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would be inequitable for a judgment debtor turned legal malpractice 
plaintiff to recover a judgment against his or her former attorney in an 
amount greater than the plaintiff could have paid on the judgment.  
Without requiring evidence of payability, the legal malpractice plaintiff has 
the opportunity to obtain a windfall in the form of damages for a 
judgment that he or she will never have to pay, as the result of a 
bankruptcy discharge, insolvency, or other circumstances.198  With such a 
lapse in the law, clients may be encouraged to allow big judgments to be 
entered against them, with the comfort of knowing that they will never 
have to pay the judgment, only to turn around and sue their lawyer for the 
full amount.199 
Requiring legal malpractice plaintiffs to prove payability is not at odds 
with the judgment rule adopted by the majority of jurisdictions.200  The 
judgment rule merely permits the legal malpractice plaintiff to bring an 
action at the time of the entry of the adverse judgment, and allows the 
statute of limitations to begin to run at that time.201  Although some 
courts have extended its application, the judgment rule, in its original 
form, does not provide that the amount of the judgment constitutes actual 
damages for a legal malpractice claim.202 
Moreover, the payability requirement does not mandate payment of the 
underlying judgment as a condition precedent to bringing a legal 
malpractice suit.203  This is what Stanley ultimately held.204  Just like in 
the majority of judgment rule cases, the Fifth Circuit in Stanley did not 
hold that the amount of the judgment for which the debtor received a 
 
198. See McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (App. Div. 2001) (opining 
that limiting legal malpractice damages to the collectible amount of the award is the best policy, 
otherwise plaintiffs would obtain a “windfall opportunity to fare better as a result of the lawyer’s 
negligence than he would have fared if the lawyer had exercised reasonable care” (quoting David A. 
Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts: Recent Developments, 78 MASS. L. REV. 74, 81–82 (1993))). 
199. See Klump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368, 1374 (7th Cir. 1995) (claiming that a windfall 
would occur in allowing the plaintiffs to sue their former attorneys for the full amount of damages 
assessed to them, rather than the amount payable).  
200. See id. (opinion that the purpose of a malpractice action is to restore the plaintiff to the 
same position he or she was in prior to the attorney’s negligent action). 
201. See id. at 1370 (noting the failure of Klump’s attorney to file his lawsuit within the statute 
of limitations, drawing a malpractice action from Klump). 
202. See Montfort v. Jeter, 567 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. 1978) (“The Court, after full 
consideration of the respective merits of the prepayment rule and the judgment rule, adopted the 
judgment rule insofar as a tort action is concerned.” (citing Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 646 
S.W.2d 91, 94–95 (Tex. 1971))). 
203. See, e.g., Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2007) (ruling that the trustee 
was not barred from bringing a malpractice claim despite Hale’s bankruptcy discharge). 
204. Id. at 431. 
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discharge in bankruptcy could be recovered as actual damages for the 
trustee’s legal malpractice action.205  Rather, the court held that the 
bankruptcy discharge did not preclude the trustee’s ability to pursue the 
legal malpractice claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, and that the 
judgment was some evidence of damages.206  Thus, under the payability 
rule, an insolvent or bankrupt legal malpractice plaintiff may still bring a 
legal malpractice claim to recover other damages, just not the amount of 
the judgment that he or she will never have to pay, or in the foreseeable 
future be able to pay. 
In addition, several of the policy reasons for adopting the judgment rule 
in bad faith settlement practices cases do not apply in legal malpractice 
actions.  Unlike insurance cases, where insurers may assume a duty of good 
faith to third parties, the general rule is that lawyers owe a duty only to 
their clients, and not to third parties with whom they have no attorney–
client relationship.207  Furthermore, the concern that the payment rule 
will encourage insurers to engage in bad faith settlement practices does not 
translate to the legal malpractice context.208  Unlike insurance cases, 
where the insurer may be able to avoid payment under the insurance policy 
by engaging in bad faith settlement practices, lawyers have nothing to gain 
by committing malpractice.  Even if the lawyer avoids a judgment against 
himself because the plaintiff failed to prove payability of the underlying 
judgment, a negligence finding against a lawyer can significantly impact his 
reputation and his ability to earn a living, and may even pose a threat to 
his bar license.  Thus, regardless of whether courts enforce the payability 
requirement, lawyers are already incentivized not to commit malpractice. 
The payability requirement does not make the viability of a legal 
 
205. See id. at 420–21 (noting that the court did not hold the amount of the judgment in 
debtor’s bankruptcy discharge could be collected as actual damages). 
206. Id. at 421. 
207. See Giacometti v. Aulla, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 727 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing the 
traditional privity rule in California which states that a contract is a prerequisite to maintaining a 
professional negligence claim); see also AG Capital Funding v. State St. Bank, 842 N.E.2d 471, 478 
(N.Y. 2005) (holding that absent privity, a plaintiff must show “‘fraud, collusion, malicious acts, or 
[some] other special circumstances’ in order to maintain a cause of action” for legal malpractice 
(quoting Estate of Spivey v. Pulley, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (App. Div. 1989))); McCamish, Martin, 
Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (stating that an 
attorney in Texas is not liable to non-client third parties for legal malpractice).  But see Camp v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1993) (finding an insurance carrier “assumed a 
duty to the bankruptcy estate” in the event of a bankruptcy under the terms of the insurance policy). 
208. See Pistalo v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“The 
rationale behind allowing full recovery to an insured who has not paid the excess judgment is to 
prevent bad-faith practices in the insurance industry . . . .” (quoting Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 
643 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994))). 
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malpractice claim turn on the ability of the former client to satisfy all or 
part of the adverse judgment entered against them.  Assuming the legal 
malpractice plaintiff has sustained actual damages because of the adverse 
judgment, the plaintiff will still be entitled to pursue a legal malpractice 
claim for those damages.209  Courts adopting the judgment rule have 
reasoned that the mere entry of an adverse judgment may cause damages in 
the form of impaired credit, potential liens on property, and harm to the 
judgment creditor’s reputation.210  We agree with this reasoning because 
even with the payability requirement in place, the plaintiff may still recover 
actual damages resulting from an unpaid judgment in the form of negative 
effects on credit, liens on property, and non-exempt property being subject 
to execution and forced sale.211  Thus, attorney tortfeasors will not be 
allowed to escape liability because of the payability rule—they will simply 
be held liable only for the actual damages sustained by the client. 
Courts adopting the minority view with respect to collectibility have 
expressed concern that the collectibility requirement ignores the possibility 
that during the life of the judgment, the underlying defendant may come 
into resources to pay all or part of the judgment against him or her.212  In 
adopting a modified version of the judgment rule, New York courts have 
held that where the legal malpractice plaintiff “was insolvent or nearly 
insolvent prior to the judgment[,]” the fact finder may “consider his past, 
his prospects, and other economic” considerations in assessing the 
plaintiff’s actual damages related to the judgment.213  In a payability case 
then, the fact finder could consider whether the circumstances are such 
that the legal malpractice plaintiff may, during the life of the judgment, be 
able to pay all or part of the judgment entered against him.  Assuming the 
legal malpractice plaintiff could prove with some certainty that he would 
 
209. See McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (noting the 
district court’s holding that the plaintiff will be allowed to introduce proof of any injuries suffered as 
a result of the alleged malpractice). 
210. See Levantino v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999–1000 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (“The 
mere entry of the excess judgment is viewed as causing legal damage since it impairs credit, subjects 
the insured’s property to the lien, diminishes his reputation and future prospects . . . .”). 
211. See McClarty, 176 B.R. at 793 (allowing the plaintiff to present proof of injury to, among 
other things, her credit rating); Montfort v. Jeter, 567 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. 1978) (remanding the 
case with instructions for the lower court to hear the plaintiff’s argument for damages incurred); 
Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 447 N.W.2d 691, 706 (Mich. 1989) (supporting the 
plaintiff’s ability to recover actual damages by showing that he or she suffered negative effects on 
credit and other financial consequences). 
212. See Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994) (stating that the passage of time 
can be significant because during the life of a judgment the plaintiff may come into resources with 
which to pay the judgment against them). 
213. Levantino, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 1002. 
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come into resources in the near future from which he could pay all or part 
of the judgment entered against him, the jury could consider that evidence 
in awarding actual damages.214  Although this seems like an unlikely 
scenario, allowing the jury to consider all of the relevant circumstances for 
payment of the judgment at some future date gives the courts a way to deal 
with this possibility when the evidence supports it. 
In conclusion, to avoid a potential windfall for former clients, courts 
must put legal malpractice plaintiffs to the test for proof of payability of 
the judgment they seek to recover as damages from the attorney. 
 
 
214. See id. (“Where the assured has meager assets and is unable to pay the judgment, the 
Pattern Jury rule thus permits the jury to consider the age, economic status, economic prospects, 
skills, health, and any other matters presently existing which would be reasonably predictive of the 
insured’s economic future.”). 
